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Although most jurisdictions still follow the rule in the principal
case it has been severely criticized. 5 Justice Brogden recognizes the
injustice of the rule as is manifest by his apologetic reason for the
decision. 6 It would seem that there should be no hesitancy in over-
ruling an arbitrary rule of law, based on erroneous reasoning, created
as a historical accident, and so unjust as to be termed barbarous by so
great a writer as Mr. Wigmore and roundly assailed by so eminent a
jurist as Judge Holmes.
DALLACE McLENNAN.
juries-Challenge for Racial Prejudice.
A negro was tried and convicted of the murder of a -white man.
Upon the voir dire examination of prospective jurors, the trial judge
overruled the defendant's request that a question relative to racial
prejudice be propounded to each and every juror. Held, the ruling
of the trial court was erroneous and the judgment of conviction must
be reversed.'
The propriety of such an inquiry to determine a disqualifying
state of a juror's mind has been generally recognized with reference
to the negro race,2 other races,8 and the defendant's nationality.4
'2 WIGmORE, EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§1476, 1477; Donelly v. United
States, supra note 4, Judge Holmes' dissenting opinion.
"The writer of this opinion speaking for himself strings with the minority
but it is the duty of the trial judge to apply the law as it is written." If this
is true can this rule ever be changed by judicial decision?
'Aldridge v. U. S., 283 U. S. 308, 51 S. Ct. 470, 75 L. ed. 628, 73 A. L. R.
1203 (1931) [reversing 47 F. (2d) 407 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931)].
2 Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837, 26 Am. St. Rep. 75 (1891) ; Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003 (1916); State v. McAfee, 64 N. C. 339
(1870) ; Fendrick v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 147, 45 S. W. 589 (1898) ; State V.
Sanders, 103 S. C. 216, 88 S. E. 10 (1916) ; People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 186,
51 N. E. 1018 (1898); State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. W. 519 (1905);
Johnson v. State, 88 Neb. 565, 130 N. W. 282, ANN. CAS. 1912B 965 (1911) ;
Bass v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 186, 127 S. W. 1020 (1910) ; Moore v. State, 52
Tex. Cr. R. 336, 107 S. W. 540 (1907) ; State v. Casey, 44 La. Ann. 969, 11
So. 583 (1892) ; Hamlin v. State, 101 Ark. 257, 142 S. W. 151 (1911) ; Cavitt
v. State, 15 Tex. App. 190 (1883); Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corpor-
ation, 40 S. W. (2d) 356 (Ky. 1931) ; Strong v. State, 85 Ark. 536, 109 S. W.
536, 14 ANN. CAS. 229 (1908) ; Lester v. State, 2 Tex. App. 432 (1877). But
see Crawford v. U. S., 59 App. D. C. 356, 41 F. (2d) 979 (1930).
'Horst v. Silverman, 20 Wash. 233, 55 Pac. 52, 72 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1898)
(Jews) ; Potter v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 216 S. W. 886 (1919) (Jews);
People v. Car Soy, 57 Cal. 102 (1880) (Chinese).
"State v. Stafford, 89 W. Va. 301, 109 S. E. .326 (1921) (Italian) ; People
v. Potigan, 69 Cal. App. 257, 231 Pac. 593 (1924) (Armenian) ; State v.
Guidice, 170 Iowa 731, 153 N. W. 336, ANN. CAS. 1917C 1160 (1915) (Ital-
ian); People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347, (1885) ("foreigners") ; cf. Watson v.
Whitney, 23 Cal. 375 (1863) "squatters").
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The question usually assumes the form of a specific interrogatory
with the purpose of determining the existence of a prejudice which
will influence the juror's verdict, as contrasted with a mere prefer-
ence for one's own race or nationality to that of the defendant's.5
The question is, therefore, consistent with other questions pro-
pounded to jurors; such as, whether they are members of an organ-
ization or association which is interested in the prosecution of the par-
ticular defendant ;6 or whether the juror is a stockholder in a corpor-
ation which is a party to the suit ;7 or whether the juror is an employee
of the defendant ;8 or whether the juror's opinion of the death penalty
will influence his verdict in a prosecution for a capital crime.9 It is
generally held that affirmative answers to such questions constitute
sufficient grounds for challenges for cause.' 0
Where the juror admits the existence of a prejudice against the
defendant's race, but states that he can render a fair verdict upon
the law and evidence, he is usually held competent for jury service."
Such rulings may be questioned on the ground that the juror is
merely expressing a belief in his own ability to render an impartial
verdict regardless of his prejudice.1
2
A person, under the constitution and laws of the United States,
is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. If a prospective juror
possesses a racial prejudice that would prevent his giving a fair and
impartial verdict, he is unfit to sit in the jury box. How, then, is it
'Pinder v. State; Hill v. State; Fendrick v. State; Strong v. State; Cavitt
v. State, all supra note 2.
'State v. Sultan, 142 N. C. 569, 54 S. E. 1002 9 ANN. CAs. 310, n. 312
(1906) ; Bethel v. State, 162 Ark. 76, 257 S. W. 740, 31 A. L. R. 402, n. 411
(1924). But mere membership in an organization or association whose policies
are adverse to the defendant, but which is not actively interested in the prosecu-
tion of the defendant, does not in itself constitute disqualification.
'Murchison National Bank v. Dunn Oil Mills Co., 150 N. C. 683, 64 S. E.
883 (1909) ; Walters v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C. 388, 81 S. E. 453 (1914) ; Note
(1912) 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 978; Note (1917) 16 R. C. L. 274.
'Oliphant v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 171 N. C. 303, 84 S. E. 425
(1916) ; Blevin v. Cotton Mills, 150 N. C. 493, 64 S. E. 428 (1909) ; Norris v.
Mills, 154 N. C. 474, 70 S. E. 949 (1911); Hufnagle v. Delaware & Hudson
Co., 227 Pa. 476, 76 Atl. 205, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 982 (1910).
'State v. Vick, 132 N. C. 995, 43 S. E. 626 (1903) ; Grant v. State, 67 Tex.
Cr. R. 155, 148 S. W. 760, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 428 (1912) ; Demato v. People,
49 Colo. 147, 111 Pac. 703, 35 L. R. A. (N. S) 621 (1910) ; Johnson v. State,
88 Neb. 565, 130 N. W. 282, ANN. CAs. 1912B 965 (1911); Note (1917) 16
R. C. L. 271.
See note 3-10, supra.
"State v. Brown; Johnson v. State; Bass v. State; Moore v. State; Ham-
in v. State; Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corporation, all supra note 3.
State v. Guidice, supra note 5." State v. Brooks, 57 Mont. 480, 188 Pac. 942 (1920).
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possible to ascertain whether he is prejudiced or not, unless such
questions are propounded to him?13 It would seem that the court in
the instant case has made satisfactory answer to this question.
JAMES 0. MooRE.
Libel and Slander-Liability of Estate for Libel in Will.
The will of testatrix contained an implication that her grandson
was illegitimate. The grandson sued the estate for libel and recovery
was allowed.1 The appellate court, in conscious disregard of com-
mon law principles, based its decision on the theory that everyone is
presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act, and that since
testatrix deliberately inserted the defamatory statement in her will,
knowing it would be published, her estate should be held liable. No
attempt was made to place liability on the executor, as the legal re-
quirement that the will be probated 2 makes the act privileged.8
Libel and slander are personal actions, and are abated by the
death of the tortfeasor. 4  The Georgia court, however, evades this
difficulty by holding that as the cause of action did not accrue until
the probate of the will, which was after the death of the testatrix, it
was not abated by her death.
Only two other decisions have been found involving the same
question and both these cases allowed recovery on the theory that
the executor was the agent of the testator and therefore the estate
was liable.5 This theory has been severely criticized. 6 There can
be no agency where no principal exists.7 If an agency is created be-
fore death, death will ordinarily revoke the agency,8 and it has been
held that death cannot create an agency.9 The Georgia court men-
People v. Reyes, supra note 5.
'Hendricks v. Citizens' & Southern Nat. Bank, 158 S. E. 915 (Ga. 1931).
'GA. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1926) §3868.
'2 COOLEY, THE LAW OF ToRTs (3rd ed. 1906) 1503.
'Acto personalis inoritur cur persona.
Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733 (1901) ; Harris v. Nashville Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, ANN. CAs. 1914C,
885 (1914).
° (1914) 12 Micr. L. REv. 489; (1914) 23 YALE L. J. 534; (1914) 62 U. PA.
L. REv. 643.
'1 MECHEM, THE LAW OF AGENCY (2nd. ed. 1914) §26, n. 2.8 Hunt v. Rousmanier's Adm'rs., 8 Wheaton 174 (1823); 1 MECHEM, THE
LAW OF AGENCY (2nd ed. 1914) §§651, 652, 655. The two exceptions to this
rule-where the agency is coupled with an interest in the subject matter, and
when the revocation would involve the agent in liability to third parties-
obviously do not apply.
'Moore v. Weston, 13 N. D. 574, 102 N. W. 163 (1904).
